6 Country Brief

Argentina’s ports concentrate along the Río de la Plata and Paraná River systems. Major terminals — Exolgan, APM 4, TecPlata, Terminal Río de la Plata — backed by Maersk (Denmark), PSA International (Singapore), and DP World (UAE). Inland river ports along the Paraná handle agricultural exports.

LPI customs score of 2.7 reflects bureaucratic strain. Delays are so entrenched that freight forwarders build them into delivery estimates. Two IDB-funded reform projects (AR-T1329, AR-L1416) launched in 2024 target customs modernization and a single-window system. Customs agency renamed from AFIP to ARCA as proof of reform.

Landlocked Bolivia has no seaports. Relies on land crossings via SUMA: Chile (Tambo Quemado, Colchane, Desaguadero) and Brazil (Quijarro). Access to Pacific via Chile’s Antofagasta and Arica. Currently negotiating access to Puerto Chancay (Peru).

Low LPI scores in both customs (2.1) and timeliness (2.4). Recurring IDB activity signals repeated attempts to fix systemic issues. As a landlocked nation, Bolivia is especially vulnerable to friction at every border it depends on.

Largest port system in South America. Port of Santos — the continent’s busiest — recently saw 48% acquisition by French CMA CGM. Amazon River ports (Manaus, Porto Velho, Santana) serve as critical inland gateways. Chinese state companies CMPort and COFCO hold stakes in Paranaguá and Santos. ICTSI investing heavily in Rio.

Customs LPI of 2.9 and timeliness of 3.5 are among the stronger scores in the region. One-off IDB activity earns an IDB score of 1. Overall moderate pressure, though complexity at scale means friction still exists in certain corridors.

Pacific ports are key to South American trade. Port of San Antonio — co-owned by Chile and DP World (UAE) — and Valparaíso are main container hubs. Port of Antofagasta has growth potential due to a major copper find. Provides Bolivia with Pacific access via Antofagasta and Arica.

LPI scores near but not quite at top-performer benchmarks. No evidence of IDB customs assistance — suggesting existing institutions are functional enough not to require external repair. Chile is the most institutionally stable country in the dataset.

Port of Cartagena is a major Caribbean hub. All major ports and land crossings are Colombian-owned. Port Buenaventura (Pacific) is Colombia’s gateway for Asia-Pacific trade. Key land borders: Cúcuta (Venezuela), Ipiales (Ecuador), Paraguachón (N. Venezuela).

Despite Colombian-owned infrastructure, CIP scores 2 due to recurring IDB projects and customs LPI of 2.5. Colombia’s border crossings are a key focus for US anti-trafficking operations.

Port of Guayaquil is the main hub. DP World’s Posorja terminal is outperforming it — closer to coast, handles larger ships, faster turnaround. Land borders at Tulcán (Colombia) and Huaquillas (Peru) managed by SENAE.

Ecuador had no 2023 LPI data. Under Lasso, IDB-funded ECUAPASS (Korean Unipass software) was deployed as a customs single-window. Executive Decree 227 required bonded warehouses to purchase X-ray scanners. Intercarga bought a $330k US Rapiscan machine in 2022 — yet SENAE’s primary contractor TC Logistics already performs this scan. The machine sits unused, cost passed to consumers. High institutional pressure: CIP 2.

Three logistics nodes: land border at Camopi, river crossing at St. Laurent du Maroni, seaport at Cayenne (~75,000 TEUs). All French-operated. Port primarily serves regional supply needs.

As an overseas French territory with EU status and French institutional oversight, French Guiana is an outlier — effectively operating under EU customs standards. Low friction, high predictability.

Port of Georgetown (~65,000 TEUs). 2015 Stabroek Block oil discovery has triggered exponential GDP growth for 5+ years. US firm Bechtel proposed a deepwater port at Berbice to support oil operations.

Rapid economic growth has not been matched by institutional capacity. LPI customs 2.3, timeliness 2.6. One-off IDB project activity. The oil boom creates competitive dynamics — especially as Venezuela may re-enter the market.

Ports on both sides of the Panama Canal. Balboa (Pacific, ~2.6M TEUs) and Cristóbal (Atlantic, ~1.2M TEUs) formerly operated by CK Hutchison (Hong Kong/China ties). Court ruled unconstitutional — transferred to APM Terminals (Maersk, Denmark). CK Hutchison suing Panama for $2B.

Despite reasonable LPI scores, CIP is 2 due to recurring IDB customs reform activity over the past decade. The Hutchison-to-APM transition adds current geopolitical complexity.

Landlocked. River access via Paraguay River and land crossings with Brazil and Bolivia. Puerto Fénix (Asunción) is the main river port. Puente Internacional de la Amistad at Ciudad del Este is a key node. Low river levels have shifted cargo to trucks. IDB financing $200M bioceanic road corridor.

Customs agency DNIT attempting a SET/DNA systems merger. LPI customs 2.4 and recurring IDB reform = CIP 2. Field observation confirms long wait times at the Brazil bridge.

Port of Callao (~3M TEUs), jointly operated by APM Terminals (Denmark) and DP World (UAE), remains the dominant Pacific gateway. Puerto Chancay — COSCO-operated mega port, first in South America to host mega-ships too large for the Panama Canal. China holds 60% via COSCO, Volcan (Peru) 40%. US State Dept warned a Peruvian court ruling blocking local oversight of Chancay threatened sovereignty.

Despite strong timeliness (3.4), customs LPI of 2.6 and recurring IDB reform = CIP 2. Chinese fishing fleets outside Peru’s EEZ add sovereignty tensions with indirect port governance implications.

Jules Sedney Terminal in Paramaribo (~104,000 TEUs), jointly owned by Suriname and DP World (UAE). Port of Nickerie (river port) operated domestically. Emerging oil boom following recent offshore discoveries.

No 2023 LPI data. CIP derived from IDB score alone: 1 (moderate). One-off IDB activity. Growing oil sector will test institutional capacity.

Terminal Cuenca de la Plata in Montevideo (~1.12M TEUs), operated by Belgian Katoen Natie — serves as hub for landlocked Paraguay and parts of Argentina. Puerto Nueva Palmira on the Paraná River, operated by Greek Navios Maritime Holdings, handles agricultural bulk cargo.

LPI scores in moderate range. However recurring IDB reform activity pushes CIP to 2. Uruguay’s institutions are among the more stable in South America (WGI governance score: 0), but the composite reflects ongoing reform needs.

Ports in crisis. Puerto Cabello, La Guaira, Maracaibo operated by state-owned Bolipuertos — placed under government intervention Sept 2024 for severe mismanagement. Puerto Cabello recorded only 272,000 TEUs in 2023.

On January 3 2026, the United States removed Nicolás Maduro from power. Ports now under heightened military control. As of Feb 2026, US began issuing sanctions relief licenses to restart oil and gas activity. Bribery and corruption risks flagged for any foreign companies re-entering.